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Abstract
Many philosophers of science are ontologically committed to a lush
rainforest of special science entities (Ross (2000)), but are often reti-
cent about the criteria that determine which entities count as real. On
the other hand, the metaphysics literature is much more forthcoming
about such criteria, but often links ontological commitment to irre-
ducibility. We argue that the irreducibility criteria are in tension with
scientific realism: for example, they would exclude viruses, which are
plausibly theoretically reducible and yet play a sufficiently important
role in scientific accounts of the world that they should be included in
our ontology.
In this paper, we show how the inhabitants of the rainforest can
be inoculated against the eliminative threat of reduction: by demon-
strating that they are emergent. According to our account, emer-
gence involves a screening off condition as well as novelty. We go on
to demonstrate that this account of emergence, which is compatible
with theoretical reducibility, satisfies common intuitions concerning
what should and shouldn’t count as real: viruses are emergent, as are
trouts and turkeys, but philosophically gerrymandered objects like
trout-turkeys do not qualify.
∗alexander.r.franklin@kcl.ac.uk
†k.e.robertson@bham.ac.uk
‡Authors listed in alphabetical order.
1
1 Introduction
If anything is real, viruses are real. That’s because viruses enter into ro-
bust generalisations that are outstandingly empirically successful. And it is
just this empirical success that motivates the scientific realist’s commitment
to them. But viruses are not fundamental, and neither are cells, phonons
or glaciers. Instead, the common expectation is that the fundamental con-
stituents of reality will only be revealed by a final theory of physics.
A common analogy relates extravagant ontologies to rainforests, on the
one hand, and sparse ontologies to deserts on the other. Those attracted
to desert landscapes stipulate that only the fundamental exists. But this is
in tension with scientific realism: when debating whether viruses exist, the
concern was the quality of the evidence and explanations involving viruses –
not whether viruses are fundamental or not. Indeed, were the scientific realist
to follow the desert-lover’s dictum of only committing to the fundamental,
her present day ontological commitments would be so sparse as to be empty,
since we lack a fundamental theory of quantum gravity.1
But the desert is not to everyone’s tastes. At the other extreme, some
(such as Schaffer (2010)) dine on an ‘ontological free lunch’: all the non-
fundamental entities such as mammals, viruses and mountains are part of
their ontology for no extra cost.2 This free lunch is a banquet: not only does
it include viruses and glaciers but also gerrymandered kinds such as trout-
turkeys and concatenations of spacetime regions. Here the debate about
the status of higher-level, or non-fundamental, ontology makes contact with
van Inwagen’s special composition question; the material plenitude view is
committed to an explosion of entities (Fairchild (2019)), and so the entities
of the higher-level sciences are bundled in alongside all possible mereological
fusions. But these gerrymandered kinds do not sit easily with the scientific
realist. If ontological commitment is so easily had, why do scientific realists
have to work so hard to establish the existence of particular scientific kinds?
The scientific realist wants the lush landscape of a rainforest, but like
1See Hoefer and Campillo (forthcoming) for an argument that the scientific realist
should be committed to the entities of all sciences other than fundamental physics.
2In this paper we are neutral on the second-order metametaphysical question as to
whether dependence or ontology is the key concern of metaphysics; we are interested in
the first-order question of which things are real and which are not.
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Goldilocks, she needs it to be ‘just right’: trouts, viruses, phonons, and gases
roam the rainforest, but trout-turkeys do not. The key issue – and the focus
of this paper – is the admittance criteria for the rainforest. The terminology
of ‘rainforest realism’ comes from Ross (2000), and although there are certain
similarities in our accounts that are discussed later, there are also significant
divergences, the foremost being the role that reduction plays.3
Traditionally, the existence of special science entities has hinged upon
whether they are ‘reducible’ or not; if it should turn out that a special science
kind is reducible then it ought to be eliminated from the rainforest.
We argue against this view. We say that viruses exist notwithstand-
ing that we can understand them in terms of lower-level entities, such as
nucleotides. Even if viruses, phonons, and mountains can be understood en-
tirely from the bottom up (that is, they are reducible), they still roam the
scientific realist’s rainforest – provided that they fulfil a certain condition:
they must be emergent, by our lights. Provided that a non-fundamental, or
special science entity is emergent, it is inoculated against being eliminated
by any theoretical reduction.
In this paper, we will give a new account of emergence that is compatible
with reduction. Then we will claim that the higher-level ontology is emergent
in this sense: viruses, gases, and phonons are emergent unlike trout-turkeys
and concatenations of random spacetime regions. In this sense, the entities
of the special sciences emerge into a lush rainforest. Thus, we set out a novel
metaphysical view that should be compelling for the scientific realist, and as
such, central to the project of naturalised metaphysics.
In section 2, we argue that irreducibility (understood as the failure of
inter-theoretic reduction) is the wrong peg on which to hang the existence of
the higher-level entities. Nonetheless, reduction is important to categorising
types of emergence. Section 3 outlines our account of emergence. According
to our account, emergence requires screening off as well as novelty. Section 4
applies our account to the case study of viruses, and section 5 demonstrates
that trout-turkeys and other gerrymandered examples fall foul of the criteria
3In this paper we do not aim to argue against the view of Schaffer, or material plenitude
in general. All of the gerrymandered kinds may exist, or be real in some sense, but they
are importantly different from the kinds that the scientific realist is committed to. Our
aim is just to spell out the difference between the entities that live in the scientific realist’s
rainforest and the gerrymandered kinds.
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and, thus, are denied admittance to the rainforest. In section 6, we relate
our account to prior analyses of rainforest realism, and show that our view
encompasses that of Ladyman and Ross, but avoids some of the criticism
levelled against their project. In section 7, we conclude.
2 The Traditional View
‘Irreducibility’ is often taken to be key to the existence of special science enti-
ties, for example, Ney (2021) says: “for the reductionist, the hope is that for
all phenomena, they will either be identified with entities of physical science
or eliminated altogether in favor of the entities of a superior theory”.4 Indeed,
irreducibility is very closely related to the name of one position committed
to the existence of the special science entities: non-reductive physicalism.
According to this view, the higher level (or special science) supervenes on
the fundamental physical level, but is not reducible to it.5
However, there are at least two distinct ways to understand what ‘irre-
ducibility’ means. First, irreducibility may be read ontologically; thus, the
irreducible entities are those which exist in addition to the fundamental en-
tities. On this ontological conception, the reduction of the mental to the
physical, or biological to the chemical is just the claim that there are no
mental (or biological) entities in addition to the physical (or chemical) enti-
ties. But this doesn’t offer any explanation for the contents of our ontology.
So, while we accept that ontologically irreducible entities will be admitted
into the rainforest, henceforth, we’ll understand (ir)reducibility as a claim
about inter-theoretic relations.
The crucial point is that, on our view, theoretical reducibility is divorced
from the criteria for realism/admittance to the rainforest, thus our project
should be of interest to those who are realist about higher-level entities even
if they hold that these are theoretically reducible.
On Nagel’s influential account of inter-theoretic reduction, one theory Tt
4See also e.g. Gillett (2016).
5The connection between the ontological status of the special science entities (such as
economies, magnets and viruses) and non-reductive physicalism is controversial. Some,
such as Barnes (2012), claim the two topics are orthogonal. Others, such as Crane (2001),
claim that these topics are the same debate under a different name.
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is reduced to another Tb if the descriptions given by Tt can be deduced from
Tb, perhaps with the aid of some additional assumptions (known as bridge
laws).6 This deduction allows the entities and their behaviour described by
Tt to be explained from the bottom up.
7 Note that this is not to suggest that
the higher-level reduced theory is, thus, redundant or could be eliminated;
only that its adequacy to its target phenomena can be explained.
Given this characterisation of reduction, we can now state the traditional
view that we oppose: the view that it’s only (theoretically) irreducible entities
that exist. This traditional view is, in fact, endorsed by Nagel (1961, p. 337)
who says that “successful [inter-theoretic] reduction of thermodynamics to
statistical mechanics is [...] taken to prove that spatial displacements are the
only form of intelligible change, or that the diverse qualities of things and
which men encounter in their daily lives are not ‘ultimate’ traits of the world
and are perhaps not even ‘real’”.
Our view is that non-fundamental entities exist if they are ontologically
emergent, and much of this paper is devoted to the detailed analysis of what
it takes to count as ontologically emergent, but we resist the conflation of
ontological emergence with theoretical irreducibility for the following reasons:
First, (ir)reducibility, as stated, is a relation between theories. While
this is a guide to the relations between the entities, there’s no completely
straightforward relation between theories, understood as scientific represen-
tations of the world, and the entities that we find in the world. On our view,
theories describe the phenomena, and entities participate in such phenomena,
where ‘entity’ is neutral between objects, states, and events (see e.g. Bogen
and Woodward (1988, p. 321)). As such, it’s not easy to make theoretical
irreducibility serviceable to distinguish between ontologically emergent and
ontologically eliminable entities.
Second, while the theoretical reducibility of entities can be called into
question, the supervenience of special science entities is far less controversial.8
6There are other related accounts around; see e.g. Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg, and Hart-
mann (2010), Rosaler (2017), and Schaffner (2013).
7Nagel’s account is closely related to, and inspired by, Hempel’s deductive-nomological
view of scientific explanation, so for Nagel reduction and explanation are interwoven. On
other accounts of scientific explanation, a deduction of Tt from Tb will not be so closely
linked to explanation.
8Even those who advocate strong emergence, such as Hendry (2010), aim to maintain
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However, in certain circumstances reduction and supervenience are not far
from one another. Indeed, when the conditions of Beth’s theorem hold, super-
venience collapses into reduction, and so maintaining supervenience without
reduction is an unstable position.9 Of course, the assumptions required for
Beth’s theorem do not hold for many realistic cases of scientific theories,
since our scientific theories are not first-order formal languages. But should
we discover that we can formulate a pair of scientific theories in a first-order
language, then it seems that the assumption of supervenience would entail
reduction, and so vanquish the commitment to the higher-level entities. But
we do not expect our commitment to the existence of viruses, mountains,
and magnets to be sensitive to such formal developments.
Third, even if viruses and suchlike can be reduced (since the theory de-
scribing them can be understood from the bottom up), we don’t think they
should be ejected from the ontology. So where we have inter-theoretic re-
duction, we needn’t then follow through with ontological reduction, or elim-
ination of the higher level. Widespread reduction looks like a plausible bet
to us. Later we will see that the case study of viruses is an exemplar of a
kind (or many kinds) that certainly should be taken to exist, but may well
be reducible. Moreover, even if viruses can’t be understood entirely from the
bottom up, that’s not the reason that they exist.
In this paper we develop an account of ontological emergence that is
compatible with theoretical reducibility. Ontological emergence then licences
admission to the rainforest and is the ground of ontological irreducibility.
While we claim that ontological emergence, rather than theoretical ir-
reducibility, is the admittance criterion to the rainforest, reduction is still
relevant for classifying types of emergence.
Although we believe that inter-theoretic reduction is plausibly
widespread, it is not a requirement of our account (that is: the dependence
condition is not reduction). As such, those (like Bedau and Humphreys
(2008) and Chalmers (2006), and us in this paper) who define strong emer-
gence in terms of failure of inter-theoretic reduction, will take our focus to be
primarily, though not exclusively, on weak emergence. On the other hand,
the supervenience of the special sciences such as chemistry on the physical; though see
Seifert (2020) for the suggestion that Hendry’s position is unstable.
9The first philosophers to emphasise Beth’s theorem as threatening such a collapse were
Hellman and Thompson (1976); Butterfield (2011a) discusses this topic in detail.
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those like Gillett (2016), who take the strong/weak emergence distinction to
correspond, respectively, to ontological/epistemological emergence will take
our focus to be on strong emergence. Either way, our examples of ontologi-
cal emergence are, in principle, compatible with reduction, but our account
should still be relevant to those interested in (putative) failures of reduction.
3 Our Account of Emergence
Definition: An entity is emergent if and only if it is involved in
dependencies that are novel and screen off lower-level details.
According to us, emergent entities feature in macrodependencies that
have two key features. Firstly, the macrodependencies must ‘screen off’ the
microdetails in a certain sense, as will be discussed in section 3.1. Secondly,
the macrodependencies must be suitably novel, as will discussed in section
3.2.
But what are the macrodependencies that we have in mind? Macrode-
pendencies are projectible; each macrodependency may fall into various cat-
egories, but it can be useful to distinguish the following. They can be dy-
namical: as is the case with the differential equations for reaction rates
in chemistry, population dynamics in biology, or the equations describing
the approach to equilibrium in statistical mechanics. There are also causal
macrodependencies: perception of predators by prey causes flight, or a change
in temperature causes change in magnetisation. And often the macrodepen-
dencies are law-like: for example, the ideal gas law is an example of a nomic
macrodependency, as are the laws of the special sciences such as economics’
law of supply and demand. By ‘macrodependency’ we do not place any con-
straint on the scale at which the dependency operates, only that it is not a
dependency featuring in any putative fundamental physical theory.
Note that, despite discussing scientific representations or descriptions,
we aim for our account of emergence to be one of ontological emergence.
Accounts of emergence in the philosophy of science are often dismissed as
merely of epistemological interest (cf. Barnes (2012)), and clearly accounts
that define emergence as involving ‘surprise’ or ‘unexpected features’ ren-
der emergence a feature of our knowledge of the world. But we think that
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emergence is a feature of the world rather than our descriptions of the world.
That being said, the best way we can get a handle on such worldly features
is through our scientific theories – our scientific representations of the world.
Consequently, we refer to the ‘microdetails’ that correspond to features both
in particular scientific descriptions and in the facts they represent.
In addition, we assume that the macrodependencies in question are gen-
uine macrodependencies. That is, in keeping with the attitude with the stan-
dard scientific realist, we presume that there are higher-level laws, higher-
level causal relations, and higher-level dynamics.10
In general, emergence balances some form of dependence on the more
fundamental with some form of independence, autonomy or distinctness.11
Our account of emergence is slightly unorthodox in that we won’t have one
criterion for the form of dependence and a separate one for the form of
independence. Both will be present in the first of our two conditions for
emergence: screening off. Macrodependencies that screen off microdetails are
important because they are central to understanding how higher-level facts
can be autonomous (in a particular sense) from the underlying microfacts.
3.1 Screening Off
Entities count as emergent in our sense if they enter into macrodependencies
that have two features: novelty and screening off. The macrodependency in
question must screen off some lower-level details that might seem – at first
glance – highly relevant to the phenomena in question. This screening off
condition has two parts: a dependence part – ‘unconditional relevance’, and
an independence part – ‘conditional irrelevance’.
Let’s start with an example of a nomic macrodependency: under usual
background conditions, water boils at 100◦C. This is a macrodependency B-
A: where B is the temperature, and A is the boiling of the kettle. We will
10The assumption that there are genuine special science laws, dynamics, and causes is
part and parcel of the scientific realist’s view, but note: this presumes that a satisfac-
tory solution to Kim’s causal exclusion problem has been found, e.g. by explaining why
overdetermination is non-problematic (cf. Bennett (2007)).
11Taylor (2015, p. 654): “emergent properties are macro- level properties that are in
some sense both dependent on and autonomous from their underlying micro-level proper-
ties”.
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use this to illustrate the key idea of screening off, and the connection to a
particular account of autonomy from which we take the core ideas.
First, let’s consider the dependence part. While there’s a macrodepen-
dency B-A describing the goings on in the kettle, there are other relevant
details – in particular there are lower-level details that B and A supervene
upon. In this example, water boiling depends on the underlying properties:
the molecular motion of the water molecules is relevant to whether the kettle
boils (if they are moving faster, then the kettle is more likely to boil). This
is the dependence part of the condition.
We can spell this out following the framework discussed by Woodward
(2021) in terms of ‘unconditional relevance’. The lower-level description, or
microstate, of the water is relevant to whether the kettle boils. There is a
probabilistic fingerprint of this dependence but to make this precise we need
to specify what the microstate or lower-level description (LLD) is. For now,
we take the LLD to be the supervenience basis of the temperature (B). (We
will come to the supervenience basis of A shortly).
Since (in)dependencies can be represented using probabilities, we can
define unconditional relevance as follows.
Unconditional relevance: conditional on a particular lower-level
description, the probability of the macro-description A obtaining
increases: P (A|LLD) > P (A). Under certain circumstances12,
P (A|LLD) = 1.
But lots of the lower-level fine-grained details don’t matter, i.e. they
don’t influence the macrodescription. One way of putting this: those details
can be changed without influencing A. So there are other descriptions LLD1,
LLD2... LLDN for which P (A|LLDi) > P (A). In the kettle example, there
are a range of distinct molecular motions that give rise to the kettle boiling –
exactly how the boiling is realised doesn’t matter. (E.g. swapping molecule
105830’s position with molecule 300594’s position makes no difference). We
can think of these different lower-level descriptions as forming an equivalence
class, a collection of lower-level descriptions that influence macrofact A.
12If the microdynamics take all the members of the supervenience basis of B to members
of the supervenience basis of A.
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Now onto the independence part. For now, let’s assume that which mem-
ber of the equivalence class of microstates is instantiated isn’t going to matter
to the occurrence of A (we will relax this assumption shortly). This foreshad-
ows how the lower-level details are irrelevant – roughly, given the macrostate
B (namely 100◦C), the molecular motion is irrelevant.
As such, molecular motion is unconditionally relevant to the boiling of
your kettle – that is, the boiling depends on the molecular motion. But
once we conditionalise on the temperature of the water, any further details
of the molecular motion are irrelevant. This is known as conditional irrel-
evance. While we are operating under the assumption that B-A is a strict
macrodependency, this is then a case of exact screening off and we can define
conditional irrelevance:
Conditional irrelevance (strict version): P (A|B&LLD) =
P (A|B) = x where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.13
Conditional irrelevance is a screening off condition: due to the macrode-
pendency B-A, conditionalising on B screens off the influence of LLD on A. In
other words, in this case, all the influence of LLD (the microstate underlying
B) is mediated through B.
These (in)dependencies can be represented graphically, as is familiar from
both the literature on levels of dynamics and the causal modelling literature.
Moreover, the conditional irrelevance condition is akin to the causal Markov
condition in a multi-level setting: the most proximate causal parents of A
screens off any other ancestor.
The left hand diagram in Figure 1 shows a directed acyclic graph familiar
from the causal modelling literature – the horizontal arrows represent causal
dependence. The Causal Markov condition requires that nearest ancestors,
i.e. more proximate causes, screen off more distant ancestors, such that Y
screens off X from Z. In the grounding literature, see e.g. Schaffer (2016),
there is an analogous Markov condition – thus, in the middle diagram the
vertical arrows represent grounding. The P (psychological) facts screen off
the N (neurophysical) facts from the W (well-being) facts. The intervention-
ist framework generalises to a multilevel framework (Eva and Stern (2020)).
13Note this does not require that the macrodependency B-A is deterministic, i.e.
P (A|B) = 1, if x < 1 then B could still screen off LLD.
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Figure 1: In all three diagrams, the red circled variable or fact screen off the
downstream fact (Z, W or A respectively) from their ancestors: a generalised
Markov condition.
In the right hand diagram, there is a multi-level Markov condition: B screens
off the LLD from A.14 The arrow from B to A represents the macrodepen-
dency, which could be causal, nomic or dynamical. We do not commit to
the nature of the dependency from LLD to B, but it could just be taken to
be supervenience. In this way ‘unconditional relevance’ fits with the super-
venience physicalism of the non-reductive physicalist – but the arrows could
represent other dependence relations such as grounding.
Now let’s relax the assumption that the macrodependency B-A is strict.
After all, it is far more realistic for special science laws to have exceptions,
as Fodor (1974) emphasised. Special science laws, such as Mendel’s law, the
Law of demand and Snell’s law, are frequently taken to be ceteris paribus
laws for this reason.
Let’s take a case of levels of dynamics, since this is the example that
Fodor discusses. Exceptions to the macrodependency B-A occur when one (or
more) members of the supervenience basis of B (the LLDi....LLDN earlier)
is not taken to the supervenience basis of A, as depicted in Figure 2. Such
exceptions are sometimes called ‘deviant microstates’.
14For reasons that we will see shortly, this is an idealised case. When B-A is not a
deterministic case of causation, then the multi-level Markov causation requires the sub-
vening parent of A as well as A’s causal parent, B for exact screening off, see Eva and
Stern (2020) for more details.
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In the case where the LLD is a deviant microstate, which member of the
equivalence class is instantiated clearly does matter; so, in the example in
Figure 2, LLD3 would not raise the probability of A.
Figure 2: In this case, not every member of the supervenience basis of B is
taken by the microdynamics T to the basis of A. This is how Fodor (1974)
argues that the laws of special sciences have exceptions.
As shown in Figure 2, the microdynamics T take microstates from earlier
to later. If we have a strict macrodependency, then B screens off LLD exactly.
(So in terms of conditional irrelevance: P (A|B&LLD) = P (A|B).) But, as
shown in the diagram, when not every member of the equivalence class of
the LLD subvening B is taken to the supervenience basis of A, then we only
have approximate screening off.
Consider the game of life (see e.g. Dennett (1991)): the microstate of the
grid and the grid microdynamics are unconditionally relevant to the later
macrostate, but are screened off by macrodynamics such as glider dynamics
(a collection of cells that form a glider will travel with a certain velocity). But
the glider dynamics in the game of life only hold until, e.g., a particularly per-
nicious piece of debris floats by destroying the glider pattern. Consequently,
the glider dynamics only apply over certain timescales and for certain initial
conditions.
Another example is found in statistical mechanics. There are two levels of
dynamics: the reversible microdynamics, and the irreversible macrodynam-
ics, such as the Boltzmann equation. The full microstates and microdynamics
are unconditionally relevant to the later macrostate, but are screened off by
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the macrodynamics. There are, occasionally, deviant microstates that are
not taken by T from the supervenience basis of B to the supervenience basis
of A.
In both cases, the screening off condition is weakened to an approximate
screening off. P (A|B) ≈ P (A|B&LLD) because if the particular LLD is
one of the deviant microstates such as LLD3, then the P (A|LLDdev) is very
different from P (A|LLDnotdev).
Conditional irrelevance (full generality): P (A|B&LLD) ≈
P (A|B) = x where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Why think that this still counts as ‘screening off’ if it’s only approximate?
Even though it’s approximate, it still has teeth: in particular, the ap-
proximate nature of the generalised screening off condition does not prevent
it from delivering clear verdicts. The lower-level details are approximately
screened off by statistical mechanical dependencies, which makes gases and
entropy candidates for being emergent. But other putative dependencies
(such as total cholesterol causes heart disease) do not even approximately
screen off the lower-level details (whether it is high or low density choles-
terol), and so total cholesterol is not a candidate emergent entity since the
macrodependency in question does not screen off – even approximately.
If the approximate nature sits uneasily, there are two possible responses,
both of which are independently used in the philosophy of physics literature,
and ceteris paribus laws literature where examples are often taken from the
special sciences.
The first response is that background conditions may allow us to rule
out the deviant microstates as follows. In the statistical mechanical case,
the system will approach equilibrium unless there are very finely balanced
correlations in the microstate. These are ruled out in the choice of initial con-
ditions used in constructing the macrodynamics from the microdynamics –
this constraint on initial conditions is called ‘Naturalness’ by Wallace (2019).
Arguably, this construction allows us to see the limited domain of applicabil-
ity of the macrodynamics – they only apply for certain initial states. In these
cases, by stipulating the right background conditions, the exact screening off
condition is restored. That is, in examples such as statistical mechanics
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where we know the caveats, we can convert P (A|B&LLD) ≈ P (A|B) to
P (A|B&LLD) = P (A|B) by explicitly stating the deviant circumstances
(e.g. the unnatural initial states, and timescales longer than the recurrence
time).
More generally, this echoes certain approaches to understanding ceteris
paribus laws – how to understand ceteris paribus laws turns out to be closely
tied to one’s metaphysics of laws (cf. Earman and Roberts (1999)).
For example, on Fodor (1991)’s account the ceteris paribus law is rendered
strict by including extra information (known as ‘completers’) that rules out
the deviant states, or interfering factors (Pietroski and Rey (1995) take a
similar view). For Lange’s stability account of laws and Woodward and
Hitchcock’s invariance account, unlike universal laws, ceteris paribus laws
hold only for a limited range of counterfactual suppositions.
However, some approaches to the metaphysics of laws do not spell out the
circumstances in which the ceteris paribus law/macrodependency holds, but
just stipulate that under ‘normal conditions’ or ‘with high probability’ B-A
(Schurz (2002)). This leads us to the second option for understanding the
approximate screening off: namely, to note that in the case of macroscopic
systems, the deviant microstates are very few and far between. Consequently,
the approximate equality is incredibly close to being an equality sign. This re-
sponse works especially well in statistical physics, where deviant microstates
can be demonstrated to constitute a staggeringly small fraction of all pos-
sible microstates. Other special sciences will have their own standards for
goodness of approximation.
To sum up: macrodependencies that screen off are key to our account.
While we have focused on dynamical dependencies in explicating this idea,
nomic and causal dependencies operate in the same way. An example of the
former: the ideal gas law. The quantum state and dynamics are uncondi-
tionally relevant (to motivate this: if matter were not quantum, it wouldn’t
be stable), but the ideal gas law screens off these microdetails: the temper-
ature is determined by pV/nR. Causal generalisations are used in biology.
To briefly mention an example that will be discussed in detail in section 4:
the underlying amino acids are unconditionally relevant to the behaviour of a
virus, but the macrodependency between the viral infection and the mottling
of tobacco leaves screens off these lower-level details.
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Note that our account is connected to autonomy in the following way:
the macrodependency that screens off the LLD warrants the claim that the
macrofact A is autonomous. For Fodor (1997), the autonomy of the spe-
cial sciences is partially tied to the irreducibility of these descriptions. But
our screening off condition, and the account of autonomy it comes from is
compatible with inter-theoretic reduction. For instance, in the temperature
example above, the higher-level variables and their inter-relations can be un-
derstood (or derived from) the lower-level descriptions in terms of molecular
motion. Likewise in the case of autonomous macrodynamics, like the Boltz-
mann equation, the higher-level macrodynamics can be constructed from the
underlying microdynamics. As such, theoretical reducibility is compatible
with screening off.
3.2 Novelty
In many cases, the entities that feature in the macrodependencies that screen
off are emergent. Viruses, phonons, gases, and wildebeest feature in macrode-
pendencies that screen off, and are emergent – they are archetypal inhabitants
of the rainforest.
But consider this case: when two stars are in orbit around a common cen-
tre of mass, they may be considered to be a binary star system. Such a system
will in general be orbiting further objects, such as, say, a super-massive black
hole. The trajectories of the individual stars will be unconditionally relevant
to the trajectory of the binary star system, but by conditionalising on their
joint centre of mass, one can compute the trajectory of the binary star system
around the black hole. So the dynamical dependency involving the centre
of mass variable (e.g. Newton’s equations) screens off the individual stars’
trajectories. This is a case of screening off. But it seems wrong to us to say
that the binary star system is admitted to the rainforest in addition to the
two stars that compose it.
We claim that the dependencies of binary star systems are missing novelty
relative to the underlying two stars, whereas gases and viruses are relatively
novel in this respect. Thus, the binary star system isn’t admitted to the
rainforest because the nomic dependencies describing the binary star system,
whether these are those of Newtonian gravitation or general relativity, are
just the same nomic dependencies that describe the trajectories of the two
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individual stars. Our novelty criterion thus captures what Mitchell (2012)
and Wimsatt (2007) are after with their stipulation that emergence is non-
aggregative: an aggregate of arbitrary parts doesn’t emerge unless some novel
macrodependency is identified.
Among the criteria that real entities satisfy, novelty stands out as both
the least controversial and the most contested: if an entity isn’t novel in
some sense then it’s already included in the ontology at some other level,
and including it would be doubling up, so everything in the ontology ought
to have some novelty with respect to the remainder of the contents of the
ontology. But it’s difficult to find much consensus in the literature as to what
novelty involves.15
Given our ontological focus, merely stating that novelty corresponds to
epistemic criteria such as ‘surprising relative to some reference class’ or ‘un-
expected’ (see e.g. Butterfield (2011a,b)) is insufficient.
One might hope, contra Butterfield, that more can be said than ‘we know
novelty when we see it’. Indeed, if there are no inter-subjective standards
for novelty, then it’s of very limited use as a criterion for emergence – the
differing metaphysical tastes of scientists and analytic metaphysicians might
impact their judgements about novelty, rendering the broader enterprise cir-
cular. Their differing tastes might themselves be explained by features of
the judgments they have been exposed to. For instance, philosophers trained
on logic judge that if the laws of fundamental physics are complete, then
everything else ‘follows from’ this – not leaving much room for novelty. In
contrast, physicists witness radically different behaviour in different domains.
Fluid behaviour differs from atomic behaviour, quantum fields behave differ-
ently from ordinary particle mechanics. Most strikingly, the macroscopic
behaviour described by classical mechanics differs radically from microscopic
behaviour described by quantum mechanics. Thus, physicists would say that
the classical world qualifies as novel, and so is emergent; see Wallace (2012).
For us, a macrodependency is novel if and only if it’s not type-
identical to the microdependencies that instantiate it. Note that this
conception of novelty is inherently contrastive – a macrodependency is novel
with respect to a given microdependency.
15See e.g. Butterfield (2011a), Chalmers (2006), Knox (2016), and J. Wilson (2010) for
a range of distinct views.
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The idea is that lower-level kinds or entities may be connected, joined up,
and organised in a multitude of ways. As a consequence of these organisations
the combined whole at the higher level participates in novel macrodependen-
cies, that are not identical with any microdependencies, and it’s this which
justifies the inclusion of that whole as a new kind in the rainforest.
One challenge faced by attempts to identify what’s novel about higher-
level entities is to avoid requiring too strong a species of novelty. While
our account is compatible with higher level entities’ being strongly emer-
gent, strong emergence shouldn’t be a foregone conclusion of our account.
Instead, we aim to avoid the theoretical irreducibility criterion for higher-
level ontology. Those who regard ‘novelty’ as essentially incompatible with
theoretical reduction may substitute ‘distinctness’ throughout.
Novelty manifests in slightly different guises in physics and biology –
respectively, different functional form, and novel causal powers. In the re-
mainder of this section, we develop this, and relate it to the concept of
cross-classification.
Taking physics first, an entity is novel if it features in macrode-
pendencies with distinct functional form from the corresponding
microdependencies. Gases, as described by thermodynamics, have a great
many macrodependencies that are of a different type to the microdependen-
cies that describe the behaviours of their particles. A well-studied example is
that the particles may be described by time-reversible Hamiltonian dynamics,
and the gas described by the time-irreversible Boltzmann equation. These
clearly have a different functional form, and such functional forms give rise
to different properties for each equation notwithstanding that, given certain
conditions, one equation is derivable from the other.
This feature of distinct functional form is generic across physics: the
relations between different theories involve differing dynamics and macrode-
pendencies that aren’t identical to any microdependencies. One further com-
monplace example is that the functional form of the dependencies of classical
mechanics is distinct from those found in quantum physics, and this helps
explain why both the classical and the quantum domains contribute entities
to the rainforest.
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, we think that the meta-
physics of science should be understood in terms of dependencies. While dy-
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namical and nomic dependencies are standard in physics, (see e.g., Price and
Corry (2007) for arguments not to use causal language in physics), biological
and higher-level sciences are often conceptualised in causal terms. We follow
the relevant literature in cashing out novelty here in relation to causal pow-
ers, yet we are not committed to any particular conception of causal powers,
and expect our approach to remain friendly to the Humean (cf. J. Wilson
(2014)), In our view, where A depends on B, B may be understood to have
the power or disposition to bring about A. The macrodependencies in which
B participates determine what B can do, i.e. what powers B has. Given this
connection, we can relate our discussion of novel macrodependencies to the
literature on novel powers.
As further discussed in section 4, higher-level biological entities can do
things that lower-level entities cannot do. For example, tobacco mosaic
viruses (TMV) have the power to mottle tobacco leaves, whereas the amino
acids that constitute the virus do not have that power. So, the dependen-
cies between TMV and tobacco leaves are distinct and of distinct types from
the dependencies between the amino acids found in the leaves and the virus.
Such distinct macrodependencies have distinct functional forms, and thus,
the same type of novelty is found here as in the physics case. Not only is this
the same type of novelty as in the physics case, our conception of novelty
may be understood to subsume the following approach.
J. Wilson (2011), in arguing that non-reductive kinds can be causally
efficacious, finds such efficacy not only with distinctive causal powers (which
she sees as akin to strong emergence) but also “with distinctive collections
of powers” (ibid. p.135).
The general idea, which has been taken up widely, see e.g. Tahko (2020),
is that higher-level kinds feature a particular proper subset of the full range
of causal powers located in the lower-level realising kinds. Novelty is then a
consequence of the higher level having strictly fewer powers than its realisers.
This guarantees that the higher level has a distinct but dependent causal
profile. If an entity is individuated by its powers, then this characterisation
underwrites additions to the ontology.
J. Wilson (2021, p. 51) draws an interesting distinction between ‘funda-
mentally novel’ and ‘nonfundamentally novel’ powers, where the former but
not the latter entail strong emergence; only nonfundamentally novel powers
are to be fully explained in terms of the subset strategy. In accordance with
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our overall aim to remain compatible with but not committed to theoreti-
cal reducibility, we remain neutral on whether our powers are fundamentally
or nonfundamentally novel. Given that proviso, a higher-level entity is
novel if it has novel causal powers.
But we think that there are two extensions to her account that our
approach can give. Firstly, we emphasise the importance of organisa-
tion/dynamical interaction for novel causal powers, and secondly and re-
latedly, we connect this to cross classification.
On the first point, it’s important that novelty is related to the dynamical
structure, interactions, and organisation of parts in the entity – that’s what’s
responsible for the new entity having strictly fewer powers than those of its
parts, yet being able to do things that its parts cannot do individually.
On the second point, these notions are connected by the more general con-
cept of cross-classification. This is the idea that ontological divisions at one
level are distinct from the ontological divisions at another level. Wherever
we find a genuinely novel macrodependency that’s sufficiently distinct from
the corresponding microdependency then such dependencies will cut across
one another. Consequently, the entities which we read off these dependencies
are cross-classified.
For example, relative to the underlying proteins, viruses have novel causal
powers. That is, they exhibit distinct macrodependencies associated with
the following cross-classification: at the higher level the dependencies relate
TMV to tobacco leaves, whereas at the lower-level dependencies relate, for
example, the RNA to the proteins it codes for. What’s significant for cross-
classification is that some of the dependencies between the component parts
of TMV are also found between the component parts of the tobacco leaf.
So the ontological division into virus and leaf cuts across the ontological
division into RNA and proteins. Likewise, in the physics case, the ontological
division into gases and the containers (into which gases spread) cuts across
the ontological division into molecules before and after collision. Sorting the
entities into the higher-level kinds ‘gas’ and ‘container’ or ‘leaf’ and ‘virus’
won’t line up with the lower-level’s ‘molecules with various speeds’, ‘proteins’,
and ‘RNA’.
The macrodependencies responsible for screening off the microdetails are
not type-identical to the microdependencies. And since we read off our on-
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tology from these patterns/laws/dependencies, the cross-cutting of macro
and microdependencies leads to a cross-classification of the ontological divi-
sions or kinds at the higher and lower levels – cementing the notion that the
higher-level entities are indeed distinct from the lower-level entities.
It’s, thus, the novelty of the dependencies that lead to cross-classification
and, together with the screening off of the dependencies, underwrites the
status of the higher-level entities as ontologically emergent.
As noted above, this conception of novelty is compatible with theoretical
reducibility. We can, for example, explain how proteins come together to
form a virus that can do things the proteins can’t do individually, or how
collections of particles with certain initial conditions can act differently from
the particles individually. Their interactions are governed by the microde-
pendencies, but the totality is governed by the macrodependencies. That’s
not mysterious, and doesn’t entail the denial of microphysicalism, but, for
the reasons discussed above it does provide a basis for ontological emergence.
It’s important to note that our focus on cross-classification is significantly
inspired by Eleanor Knox’s introduction of variable change as a criterion for
emergence; see Knox (2016). Changing variables is a useful strategy for
uncovering dependencies that may turn out to be novel and screen off the
microdetails.16 In this way, our account elaborates Knox’s account as a meta-
physical account of emergence, rather than as an epistemological account as
some, such as De Haro (2019) have read it. While we think this is a misread-
ing, to avoid similar confusions about our project, we emphasise that variable
changes are of especial importance when these help identify distinct depen-
dencies and consequent cross-classification. Knox also emphasises a different
kind of novelty to our account: she argues that the combination of change
of variables and abstractions gives rise to novel explanatory value. For us,
this is because changing variables and abstractions uncover new dependen-
cies, and these dependencies generate novel explanations by providing the
causal or nomic link between explanantia and explananda. Our account thus
underwrites the connection between novel explanatory value and emergence.
Although we don’t focus on explanation as a criterion for admittance into
the rainforest, we embrace this consequence of our account.
16Changing variables can help us find dependencies/patterns that are “there for the
picking up if only we are lucky or clever enough to hit on the right perspective” Dennett
(1991, p. 41).
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Perhaps some will find this all to be inadequate: they might hold that real
novelty requires a dependency relation that goes beyond what is determined
by fundamental physics. So long as we maintain compatibility with theoret-
ical reducibility to fundamental physics, then these folks will hold that no
dependency counts as truly novel with respect to its reductive base.
Our response to such claims is to admit that this is indeed a salient
philosophical understanding of ‘novel’. However, we return to the claims ex-
pressed earlier: we hold that irreducibility is an inappropriate criterion for
inclusion in the ontology. As such, given that novelty is the right kind of cri-
terion, it’s appropriate to interpret ‘novelty’ in a way that’s compatible with
reducibility. Thus, we hope to be judged by the upshots of our framework
rather than falling prey to objections concerning the alternate meanings of
individual terms.
4 Case Study: A Virus
Pretty much everyone alive in 2020 or 2021 knows that viruses can have a
causal impact both on individual humans, and, more specifically, on indi-
vidual humans’ lungs, olfactory systems, immune systems, and on human
societies more generally. For those who think that to exist is to play an es-
sential role in causally bringing about certain effects, or to exist is to play an
essential role in scientific explanations, or to exist is to feature in scientific
laws, it should be incontrovertible that viruses exist.17 If ‘ontologically emer-
gent’ just means exists and is non-fundamental, then viruses are, therefore,
ontologically emergent.
As such, in this section the case of viruses is presented as a useful exemplar
of a kind (or many kinds) that certainly should be taken to exist, but may
well be understood from the bottom up, and, at least, insofar as they can’t
be understood entirely from the bottom up, that’s not the reason that they
exist.
Are viruses in fact theoretically reducible? Can one explain how viruses
function by investigating their parts and the details of the interactions among
their parts? To these questions we answer ‘yes’.
17See Khalidi (2013, §5.4) for a discussion of virus as a natural kind.
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Take, for example, the Tobacco Mosaic virus (TMV) – this is of course a
very simple example of a virus – one could hold that only more complicated
viruses exist over and above their parts, but this seems untenable, and TMV
is well known to be virulent and have a devastating impact on tobacco crops
– thus, it’s difficult to challenge its causal profile.18
TMV’s “rod shape results from its basic design, namely a regular helical
array of identical protein subunits, in which framework is embedded a single
molecule of RNA wound as a helix” Klug (1999, p. 531).
According to Liu and Nelson (2013): “Tobacco mosaic virus (TMV)
encodes four known functional proteins: the 126 and 183 kDa replication-
associated proteins, the movement protein (MP), and the structural capsid
or coat protein (CP).” The coat protein, for example, can be further analysed
into 2130 identical coat protein subunits following the right-handed helix of
an accompanying RNA strand to produce a 300 nm hollow cylinder with an
outer diameter of 18 nm and a 4 nm wide central channel.
Proteins are strings of amino acids. So there are many parts, but it’s only
when the parts are arranged in the right way into the whole that the virus
gets its novel explanatory and causal attributes.19 The wrong assemblage of
parts would be inert – viruses are able to infect hosts exactly when their parts
are assembled in the right way. When this happens abstractions from the
detailed interactions of the parts are legitimated and the dependencies that
underwrite causal and explanatory claims are in terms either of the virus as
a whole or in terms of the interactions of the proteins.
While there remain unanswered questions about the functioning of viruses
and proteins, it seems both pessimistic and unwarranted to claim that such
questions aren’t answerable at all. At least we wouldn’t bet against the
vast array of research projects involved with mapping and understanding
the complex details of how viruses work. As such, the theoretical reduction
(according to some or other account) of viruses seems highly plausible.
We say: there are viruses in the rainforest (i.e. viruses feature in our best
ontological inventory). Unless there is some radical and unforeseen scientific
18While it’s tempting to choose Sars-Cov-2, the science on TMV is, at the time of
writing, far more settled.
19Oppenheim and Putnam discuss synthesising structurally identical but causally inert
collections of proteins that mirror but are not identical to TMV.
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revolution, viruses are essential to our scientific account of the world. And,
as such, those who accept that there are non-fundamental real kinds or en-
tities ought to accept viruses into their ontology. That’s the justification for
including viruses in the ontology, but the explanation for viruses’ inclusion
over and above the parts which constitute viruses, is that viruses are on-
tologically emergent, that is: that virus dependencies screen off lower-level
descriptions and are novel.
Virus dependencies screen off: the behaviour of the amino acids is
unconditionally relevant, but conditionally irrelevant to the virus’s efficacy.
The dependency between a viral infection and, say, the mottling of tobacco
leaves screens off the sub-parts of the virus.
The presence of an active TMV will be sufficient to enable predictions
regarding whether or not tobacco leaves will mottle or otherwise register
signs of infection. As such, conditional on a property of the virus as a whole
– whether it is active or inactive – one can abstract away from any details
of the state of the individual proteins that compose the virus, because the
macrodependencies about the virus screen off these lower-level details.
Virus dependencies are novel: as discussed above they have novel
causal powers – they can do things their parts can’t do; and virus-leaf depen-
dencies are distinct from the protein and amino acid dependencies – while
the former engender ontological divisions into plants and viruses, the latter
engender much more fine grained divisions into types of protein or amino
acid, which can be found both in viruses and plants.
5 Taking Stock: Trout-Turkeys and Other
Philosophical Conundra
The previous section showed us that viruses are admitted to the rainforest,
now it’s worth demonstrating that some putative entities are denied entry.
We are after a verdant and lush rainforest, but gerrymandered kinds ought
not to be there!
To be clear: we do not claim that the contents of the rainforest exhaust all
our ontology. As such, we take no stance as to the existence of mathematical
entities, or gerrymandered kinds such as trout-turkeys, or any other ontology.
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Rather we are interested in specifying admission criteria to the rainforest,
and we do claim that the rainforest has a particular role to play since it
contains all and only those entities to which the scientific realists ought to
be committed.20
So, are there trout-turkeys in the rainforest? The answer is, obviously,
‘no’, but to see precisely why we ought to specify a bit further exactly what
trout-turkeys are.
Trout-turkeys could be conceived of as mereological sums of trouts and
turkeys. That is, each trout-turkey is composed of one specific trout and
one specific turkey, whether or not these animals happen to be spatially
contiguous at any particular time.21
Are trout-turkeys emergent? First we need to consider the screening off
condition. Straightaway the situation is different: in the other cases, there
were bona fide scientific theories at both the lower and higher level. What
are the two levels for a trout-turkey? The higher-level theory putatively
describes the mereological complex ‘a trout-turkey’ and the lower-level theory
must either describe the collection of simples (say, atoms) that compose the
trout-turkey, or perhaps the trout and the turkey.
To state the obvious, no scientific theory of trout-turkeys is forthcoming.
Do they swim? Are they prey of other animals? How do they reproduce?
But is this lack of scientific theory for them just because of the basic kinds
and predicates we choose to describe the world? Could there be some kind of
creature that does choose to use the variable ‘trout-turkey’ and has higher-
level theories about their evolution? While of course the question of variable
choice is a tricky one entangled with the problem of induction (see e.g. Cohen
and Callender (2009)), we have principled reasons to think that trout-turkeys
are not emergent.
To demonstrate this, it is helpful to remember other examples of gerry-
mandered kinds, like Dennett’s lost socks, or to make up an example, the
centre of mass of all philosophers of science. Let’s assume we are interested
20If truly fundamental entities were ever to be discovered then these would form a
notable exception to this claim as these would not be ontologically emergent but would
feature in the scientific realist’s ontology.
21If, instead trout-turkeys were composed of half a particular trout and half a particular
turkey, the claims in the following paragraph would still apply.
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in how the location of these kinds changes over time. What description can
we give for these entities? Well, we can see how their components’ location
changes over time, and use that to see how the composite object changes
location over time. Are there dependencies involving these kinds that screen
off lower-level details? No! In order to see how the centre of mass changes
at each time step we have to look at where each member has moved to and
re-average – there is no higher-level equation/macrodependency that screens
off these microdetails.22 The locations of the components remain relevant.
Following M. Wilson (1985), one could come up with a mathematical
function to describe any arbitrary concatenation of entities, but this wouldn’t
take the form such that it would allow for projecting into the future. So, it’s
not at all clear that this should count as a macrodependency at all; this point
is made by Ross (2000, p. 162), albeit in a different idiom. More importantly,
this macrodependency would not screen off any lower-level details for the
reasons given above: to know what our trout-turkey will do, we have to
check what the trout and what the turkey do, and then re-sum. In other
words: there is no conditional irrelevance, and so the screening off condition
is not met. Trout-turkeys are not emergent.
One might have the worry at this stage that our emergent ontology is
irrecoverably vague and that this is a reason to reject the approach outright.
In particular, one might worry that conditional irrelevance was not an exact,
cut and dried condition, but involved approximate screening off. Oftentimes,
this approximation can be made exact by specifying the exact circumstances
when the lower-level details become relevant again. But when we can’t do
this, does an irking vagueness creep in?
We think not. Consider clouds: not only do these have blurry edges, but
there will be a vagueness as to whether a collection of water droplets counts
as a cloud or not. We don’t think that such vagueness can be excised, in
part because we can’t think of any scientific examples that don’t have vague
boundaries and vague edge cases. That is, even in fundamental physics,
particles are excitations of quantum fields, and there’s a vagueness both as
to the boundaries of such excitations, and when an excitation counts as a
particle or not. Our goal in this paper is not to persuade the desert advocate
– if one has the view that future, as-yet-undiscovered fundamental physics
22Perhaps there are certain higher-level regularities about the centre of mass of all
philosophers of science – the location shifts whenever there is a PSA or BSPS!
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will furnish a complete and precise ontology then that’s fine. But as long
as one is prepared to admit some non-fundamental entities, some degree of
vagueness in ontology is inevitable.
Having addressed these concerns we come to the consideration of how our
ontology relates to the well-known articulations of rainforest realism in the
existing literature.
6 Rainforest Realism
Our concern in this paper has been establishing what lives in the many-
levelled ontology of the scientific realist.23 The terminology of ‘rainforest
realism’ comes from Ladyman and Ross (2007) and Ross (2000), so how does
our account of the higher-level, or special science ontology relate to theirs?
First, we discuss how our account aligns with theirs, and then we discuss two
ways in which our account is less radical.
Dependencies play a key role in our analysis, and are clearly patterns of
some kind. But the link is tighter than this: the novel macrodependencies
that screen off lower-level details are real patterns. In this way, our account
offers an alternative explication of how patterns at one level relate to patterns
at another level such that there is a lush ontology. And our account needn’t
be considered a rival to Dennettian real patterns – indeed Ladyman explicitly
allows that the “theory of Real Patterns can be explicated in various ways”
(Ladyman (2017, claim XIV)).
Whereas the account in Ladyman and Ross (2007) focusses more on the
features of scientific representations, we emphasise the worldly backing of
such features. While we both (ibid. p.233) insist on the projectibility of
real patterns and dependencies, where they discuss the compressibility of an
encoding relative to the bitmap, our notion of screening off underlies such
compressibility. Thus, our account of the rainforest encapsulates significant
features of Ladyman and Ross’s project.
23Note that Ladyman and Ross (2007) and Shech and McGivern (2019) call this ontology
‘scale relative’. While, broadly speaking, this fits with our conception of the rainforest, we
don’t use this terminology because levels, as understood in this paper, don’t always align
with particular scales, cf. Potochnik (2017).
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One way in which our account is less radical than theirs is the status
we give to dependencies and patterns. For Ladyman and Ross, patterns are
ontologically prior to the entities that enter into them. Indeed, more radical
views, such as French (2014), go further and argue there is only relational
structure and all entities should be eliminated. While our account places
dependencies and patterns centre stage, and is compatible with structural
realism, it does not require or presuppose structural realism. On our account,
entities ontologically emerge only if they are involved in – featured on one
side or the other – of some dependency that is both novel and screens off
lower-level details. It’s the relations between dependencies discussed in detail
above, in virtue of which entities emerge. But the primacy of patterns or
dependencies in our account is not a metaphysical claim: it is just that
patterns are the starting place for our analysis and so are conceptually prior
– this needn’t entail that they are ontologically prior.
There is a further way in which our account can be considered to be a
generalisation of Ladyman and Ross: our language of autonomy and nov-
elty generalises away from, and subsumes, the information-theoretic gloss
that Ladyman and Ross give. Information-theoretic ideas are useful ways to
express the key ideas and connect the philosophical discussion to empirical
research in data science, but they are eliminable.
Ladyman and Ross defend their view by claiming that it “expresses the
principle of Occam’s razor, in restricting ontological commitment to what is
required for a maximally empirically adequate science”, and they spell this
out in terms of predictive novelty (ibid., pp. 233-234, original emphasis). We
differ from them by focussing on a slightly different form of novelty: even
though higher-level goings-on may be predictable from the bottom up, the
novel dependencies are not type-identical with those at the lower level. By ty-
ing the definition of real patterns to the availability of novel and screening-off
dependencies at higher levels, we satisfy the intuition that such dependencies
are required by maximally empirically adequate science.
On our view, real patterns might be both reducible and emergent. While
some reductions may engender elimination, those patterns which are emer-
gent are ineliminable. Even if it turns out that reduction is commonplace,
this will allow for a verdant rainforest, with an array of entities whose prop-
erties may be understood from the bottom up.
27
7 Conclusion
Ontological tastes differ: some prefer lush rainforests and others stark
deserts. While we do not presume to have persuaded those with the lat-
ter tastes, we hope to have articulated an account that makes explicit the
commitments popular among philosophers of science. Our goal is to admit
some non-fundamental scientific entities into the ontology, and to exclude
gerrymandered non-scientific kinds. We claimed that there are principled
ways to make that distinction.
We argued that those entities that are to be admitted to the rainforest are
ontologically emergent, and yet at least some of them may be theoretically
reducible. We went on to characterise ontologically emergent entities as those
that participate in novel and screened-off dependencies. Through a careful
application of these criteria, we demonstrated that viruses are in, but that
trout-turkeys are out. Finally, we showed that this approach sets rainforest
realism on firmer metaphysical ground.
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